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We examine the performance and robustness properties of monetary policy rules in an
estimated macroeconomic model in which the economy undergoes structural change and
where private agents and the central bank possess imperfect knowledge about the true
structure of the economy. Policymakers follow an interest rate rule aiming to maintain
price stability and to minimize ﬂuctuations of unemployment around its natural rate but are
uncertain about the economy’s natural rates of interest and unemployment and how private
agents form expectations. In particular, we consider two models of expectations formation:
rational expectations and learning. We show that in this environment the ability to stabilize
the real side of the economy is signiﬁcantly reduced relative to an economy under rational
expectations with perfect knowledge. Furthermore, policies that would be optimal under
perfect knowledge can perform very poorly if knowledge is imperfect. Eﬃcient policies that
take account of private learning and misperceptions of natural rates call for greater policy
inertia, a more aggressive response to inﬂation, and a smaller response to the perceived
unemployment gap than would be optimal if everyone had perfect knowledge of the economy.
We show that such policies are quite robust to potential misspeciﬁcation of private sector
learning and the magnitude of variation in natural rates.
Keywords: Monetary policy, natural rate misperceptions, rational expectations, learning.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: E52
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This paper examines the performance and robustness properties of monetary policy
rules in a model economy that undergoes structural change and where private agents and
the central bank possess imperfect knowledge about the true structure of the economy.
Our goal is to identify characteristics of monetary policy rules that are robust to imperfect
knowledge, as well as to identify those that are not. We assume the central bank follows an
interest rate policy rule that aims to maintain price stability and to minimize ﬂuctuations
of unemployment around its natural rate. The central bank, however, faces uncertainty
about the economy’s natural rates of interest and unemployment, which may vary over
time reﬂecting structural change, and how private agents form expectations.
We consider two models of expectations formation that represent diﬀerent assumptions
regarding the knowledge about the economy that private agents possess. Under rational ex-
pectations, private agents know everything about the structure of the economy; in contrast,
under the alternative model of “perpetual learning,” private agents form expectations from
forecasting models that they continuously reestimate based on incoming data.
Our analysis is conducted using an estimated quarterly model of the U.S. economy. We
ﬁrst consider the performance and robustness characteristics of simple operational monetary
policy rules under perfect and imperfect knowledge. We then analyze the characteristics
and performance of policy rules optimized taking into account model uncertainty about
expectations formation and natural rate uncertainty. We approach this problem of optimal
policy under uncertainty from Bayesian and Min-Max perspectives and compare the results.
We ﬁnd that monetary policy rules that would be optimal under perfect knowledge can
perform very poorly if they are implemented in an environment of imperfect knowledge.
In our model economy, the presence of imperfect knowledge tends to raise the persistence
of inﬂation, partly as a result of the persistent policy errors due to misperceptions of the
natural rates and partly as a result of the learning process agents may rely upon to form ex-
pectations. This leads to a deterioration in economic performance, especially with regard to
5
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imperfections in the economy can adjust their policies and protect against this deterioration
in economic outcomes.
Eﬃcient policies that take account of private learning and misperceptions of natural
rates diﬀer in several ways from the optimal policy under perfect knowledge. First, and
arguably most important, these policies call for more aggressive responses to inﬂation that
would be optimal under perfect knowledge. This ﬁnding tends to conﬁrm the conventional
wisdom that associates good central bank policy practice with policies that may appear to
stress the role of maintaining price stability more than might appear warranted in simple
models of the economy under perfect knowledge. Second, eﬃcient policies exhibit a high
degree of inertia, or “interest rate smoothing,” in the setting of the interest rate. Third,
robust policies feature a muted response to the unemployment rate gap – the diﬀerence
between the actual unemployment rate and the estimated natural rate – compared to what
would be optimal under perfect knowledge. Importantly, we ﬁnd that it is possible to design
a simple policy rule that can deliver reasonably good macroeconomic performance even in
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To paraphrase Clausewitz, monetary policy is conducted in a fog of uncertainty. Our
understanding of many key features of the macroeconomic landscape remains imperfect,
and the landscape itself evolves over time. As emphasized by McCallum (1988) and Taylor
(1993), a crucial requirement for a monetary policy rule is that its good performance be
robust to various forms of model misspeciﬁcation. In this view, it is not enough for a
monetary policy rule to be optimal in one speciﬁc model, but instead it must be “stress
tested” in a variety of alternative model environments before one can conclude with any
conﬁdence that the policy is likely to perform well in practice.1 In this paper, we examine
the performance and robustness of monetary policy rules in the context of fundamental
uncertainty related to the nature of expectations formation and structural change in the
economy. Our goal is to identify characteristics of policy rules that are robust to these types
of imperfect knowledge, as well as to identify those that are not.
The ﬁrst form of uncertainty facing the policymaker that we consider relates to the way
in which agents form expectations. There is a growing literature that analyzes a variety of
alternative models of expectations formation. The key conclusion we take from our reading
of this literature is that there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding exactly how private ex-
pectations are formed. In particular, the standard assumption of rational expectations may
be overly restrictive for monetary policy analysis, especially in the context of an economy
undergoing structural change. But, the available evidence does not yet provide unequivocal
support for any other single model of expectations formation. Therefore, fundamental un-
certainty about the nature of expectations formation appears to be an unavoidable aspect
of the policy environment facing central banks face today.
In this paper, we consider two popular alternative models of private expectations for-
mation. Our approach can easily be extended to incorporate other alternative models of
expectations as well, but for reasons of tractability, we leave this for future research. One
1For past applications of this approach, see Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003), who study the
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of the model and form expectations accordingly. This, of course, is the model used in much
of the recent monetary policy rule literature. The second model is perpetual learning, where
it is assumed that agents do not know the true parameters of the model, but instead con-
tinuously reestimate a forecasting model (see Sargent (1999) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) for expositions of this model). This form of learning represents a relatively modest,
and arguably realistic, deviation from rational expectations. An advantage of the perpetual
learning framework is that it allows varying degrees of deviations in expectations formation
relative to the rational expectations benchmark, which are characterized by variation in a
single model parameter. As shown in Orphanides and Williams (2004, 2005a, 2005b), per-
petual learning on the part of economic agents introduces an additional layer of interaction
between monetary policy, expectations, and economic outcomes.
The second source of uncertainty that we consider is unobserved structural change, which
we represent in the form of low-frequency variation in the natural rates of unemployment
and interest. The equilibrium of our model economy is described in terms of deviations
from these natural rates. In particular, the inﬂation rate is in part determined by the
unemployment gap, the deviation of the unemployment rate from its natural rate. Similarly,
the unemployment rate gap is determined in part by the real interest rate gap, the diﬀerence
between the real short-term interest rate and the real natural rate of interest. We assume
that the central bank does not observe the true values of the natural rates and, indeed, is
uncertain about the processes generating the natural rates.
Natural rate uncertainty presents a diﬃculty for policymakers who follow an interest
rate rule with the goal of maintaining price stability and minimizing ﬂuctuations of un-
employment around its natural rate. With perfect knowledge of natural rates, the setting
of policy would ideally account for the evolution of the economy’s natural rates. But, if
policymakers do not know the values of the natural rates of interest and unemployment
when they make policy decisions, they must either rely on inherently imprecise real-time
estimates of these rates for setting the policy instrument, or, alternatively, eschew natural
8
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The evidence suggests there exists considerable uncertainty regarding the natural rates
of unemployment and interest and ambiguity about how best to model and estimate natural
rates, even with the beneﬁt of hindsight.2,3 Indeed, the measurement of the natural rate of
output has been a key issue in U.S. monetary policy debates in both the 1970s and 1990s, and
uncertainty about the natural rate of interest has been the topic of increasing discussion.
The evidence indicates that substantial misperceptions regarding the economy’s natural
rates may persist for some time, before their presence is recognized. In the meantime,
policy intended to be contractionary may actually inadvertently be overly expansionary,
and vice versa. Moreover, in an environment where the private sector is learning, the
learning process can interact with the policy errors and feed back to economic outcomes, as
pointed out Orphanides and Williams, (2004, 2005a, 2005b) and Gaspar, Smets and Vestin
(2006).
We examine the eﬀects and policy implications of imperfect knowledge of expectations
formation and unknown time-varying natural rates using a quarterly model of the U.S. econ-
omy estimated over 1981–2004. We ﬁrst consider the performance and robustness charac-
teristics of simple operational monetary policy rules under perfect and imperfect knowledge.
We then analyze the characteristics and performance of policy rules optimized taking into
account model uncertainty about expectations formation and natural rate uncertainty. We
approach this problem of optimal policy under uncertainty from Bayesian and Min-Max
perspectives and compare the results.
Our analysis yields several key ﬁndings. First, the scope for stabilization of the real
economy in our model with imperfect knowledge is signiﬁcantly reduced relative to the
economy under perfect knowledge (where private agents and the central bank are assumed
2See, for instance, Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997), and Orphanides and Williams (2002) for documen-
tation of the diﬃculties associated with the measurement of the natural rate of unemployment and real-time
estimates of the unemployment gap; Orphanides and van Norden (2002), and van Norden (2002) for the
related problem regarding the output gap; and Laubach and Williams (2003), Orphanides and Williams
(2002) and Clark and Kozicki (2005) for the errors in real-time estimates of the natural rate of interest.
3Our focus is on natural rate concepts as commonly used in policy models and practical policy discussions,
which corresponds to those described by Friedman (1968). Our usage diﬀers from that of Woodford (2003)
and others, who mean by “natural rates” the outcomes that would obtain in the absence of nominal rigidities.
9
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perfect knowledge can perform very poorly when knowledge is imperfect. Third, the optimal
Bayesian policy under uncertainty performs very well across all of our model speciﬁcations
and is therefore highly robust to the types of model uncertainty that we examine here. This
policy features greater policy inertia, a larger response to inﬂation, and a smaller response
to the perceived unemployment gap than would be optimal under perfect knowledge.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the problems
for monetary policy caused by natural rate mismeasurement. Section 3 brieﬂy describes
the estimated macro model. Section 4 describes the class of monetary policy rules that we
study. Section 5 presents the models of expectations formation and natural rate estimation.
Section 6 provides details on the simulation method. Section 7 analyzes monetary policy
under diﬀerent models of expectations formation, but assuming constant natural rates.
Section 8 explores the joint eﬀects of alternative models of expectations and time-varying
natural rates. Section 9 examines the optimal Bayesian and Min-Max policies. Section 10
concludes.
2 Natural Rates, Misperceptions, and Policy Errors
We start our analysis with an illustration of some of the diﬃculties presented by the evo-
lution of the economy’s natural rates. To highlight the role of natural rate misperceptions
and the role of policy in propagating them in the economy, consider a generalization of the
simple policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993). Let it denote the short-term interest rate
employed as the policy instrument, (the federal funds rate in the Unites States), πt the rate
of inﬂation, and ut the rate of unemployment, all measured in quarter t. The classic Taylor
rule can then be expressed by
it =ˆ r∗
t + πt−1 + θπ(πt−1 − π∗)+θu(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t), (1)
where π∗ is the policymaker’s inﬂation target and ˆ r∗
t and ˆ u∗
t are the policymaker’s latest
estimates of the natural rates of interest and unemployment, based on information available
during period t. Note that in this formulation, we restrict attention to the operational
10
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information about actual inﬂation and economic activity in period t regards the previous
period, t − 1. Note also that here we consider a variant of the Taylor rule that responds
to the unemployment gap instead of the output gap for our analysis, recognizing that the
two are related by Okun’s (1962) law.4 In his 1993 exposition, Taylor examined response
parameters equal to 1/2 for both the inﬂation gap and the output gap. Using an Okun’s
coeﬃcient of 2, this corresponds to setting θπ =0 .5a n dθu = −1.0.
The Taylor rule has been found to perform quite well in terms of stabilizing economic
ﬂuctuations, at least when the natural rates of interest and unemployment are accurately
measured.5 However, historical experience suggests that policy guidance from this family
of rules may be rather sensitive to misperceptions regarding the natural rates of interest
and unemployment. The experience of the 1970s, discussed in Orphanides (2003b) and
Orphanides and Williams (2005b), oﬀers a particularly stark illustration of policy errors
that may result.6
Following Orphanides and Williams (2002), we explore two dimensions along which the
Taylor rule has been generalized that in combination oﬀer the potential to mitigate the
problem of natural rate mismeasurement. The ﬁrst aims to mitigate the eﬀects of mismea-
surement of the natural rate of unemployment by partially (or even fully) replacing the
response to the unemployment gap with one to the change in the unemployment rate.7 The
second dimension we explore is incorporation of policy inertia, represented by the presence
of the lagged short-term interest rate in the policy rule. Policy rules that exhibit a sub-
stantial degree of inertia typically improve the stabilization performance of the Taylor rule
in forward-looking models.8 As argued by Orphanides and Williams (2002), the presence
4In what follows, we assume that an Okun’s law coeﬃcient of 2 is appropriate for mapping the output gap
to the unemployment gap. This is signiﬁcantly lower that Okun’s original suggestion of about 3.3. Recent
views, as reﬂected in the work by various authors place this coeﬃcient in the 2 to 3 range.
5See, e.g. the contributions in Taylor (1999a), which are also reviewed in Taylor (1999b).
6See also Bullard and Eusepi (2005), Cukierman and Lippi (2005), and Collard and Dellas (2004).
7This parallels a modiﬁcation of the Taylor rule suggested by numerous researchers who have argued in
favor of policy rules that respond to the growth rate of output rather than the output gap when real-time
estimates of the natural rate of output are prone to measurement error. See, in particular, McCallum (2001),
Orphanides (2003a, 2003b), Orphanides et al. (2000), Walsh (2003), and Leitemo and Lonning (2006).
8See e.g. Levin et al. (1999, 2003), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Williams (2003), and Woodford
11
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of interest on the current setting of monetary policy and, therefore, the extent to which
misperceptions regarding the natural rate of interest aﬀect policy decisions. To see this,
consider the generalized Taylor rule of the form
it = θiit−1 +( 1− θi)(ˆ r∗
t + πt−1)+θπ(πt−1 − π∗)+θu(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t)+θΔu(ut−1 − ut−2). (2)
The degree of policy inertia is measured by θi ≥ 0; cases where 0 <θ i < 1 are fre-
quently referred to as “partial adjustment”; the case of θi = 1 is termed a “diﬀerence rule”
or “derivative control” (Phillips 1954), whereas θi > 1 represents superinertial behavior
(Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). These rules nest the classic Taylor rule as the special
case when θi = θΔu =0 . 9
To see more clearly how misperceptions regarding the natural rates of unemployment
and interest translate to policy errors it is useful to distinguish the real-time estimates of
the natural rates, ˆ u∗
t and ˆ r∗
t, available to policymakers when policy decisions are made, from
their “true” values u∗ and r∗. If policy follows the generalized rule given by equation (2),
then the “policy error” introduced in period t by misperceptions in period t is given by
(1 − θi)(ˆ r∗
t − r∗)+θu(ˆ u∗
t − u∗
t).
Although unintentional, these errors could subsequently induce undesirable ﬂuctuations
in the economy, worsening stabilization performance. The extent to which misperceptions
regarding the natural rates translate into policy induced ﬂuctuations depends on the param-
eters of the policy rule. As is evident from the expression above, policies that are relatively
unresponsive to real-time assessments of the unemployment gap, that is those with small θu,
minimize the impact of misperceptions regarding the natural rate of unemployment. Simi-
larly, inertial policies with θi near unity reduce the direct eﬀect of misperceptions regarding
the natural rate of interest. That said, inertial policies also carry forward the eﬀects of past
(2003).
9Policy rules that allow for a response to the lagged instrument and the change in the output gap or
unemployment rate have been found to oﬀer a simple characterization of historical monetary policy in
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take account of this interaction in designing policies robust to natural rate mismeasurement.
A limiting case that is immune to natural rate mismeasurement of the kind considered
here is a “diﬀerence” rule, in which θi = 1 and θu =0 :
it = it−1 + θπ(πt − π∗)+θΔu(ut − ut−1). (3)
As Orphanides and Williams (2002) point out, this policy rule is as simple, in terms of the
number of parameters, as the original formulation of the Taylor rule and is arguably simpler
to implement in practice since it does not require knowledge of the natural rates of interest
or unemployment. However, because this type of rule ignores potentially useful information
about the natural rates of interest and unemployment, its performance relative to the classic
“level” Taylor rule and the generalized rule will depend on the degree of mismeasurement
and the structure of the model economy, as we explore below.
3 An Estimated Model of the U.S. Economy
We examine the interaction of natural rate misperceptions, learning, and expectations for
the design of robust monetary policy rules using a simple quarterly model motivated by the
recent literature on micro-founded models incorporating some inertia in inﬂation and output
(see Woodford, 2003, for a fuller discussion). The speciﬁcation of the model is closely related
to that in Gianonni and Woodford (2005), Smets (2003), and others. The key diﬀerence
is that instead of the output gap concept in these models, we employ the unemployment
gap concept as the cyclical measure of real economic activity. As already noted, the two
concepts are closely related in practice by Okun’s law and the properties of the model are
largely invariant to this choice. In addition, the empirical problem of measuring the natural
rate of unemployment—needed to deﬁne the unemployment gap—is essentially similar to
the problem of measuring the level of potential output—needed to deﬁne the output gap.
13
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The model consists of the following two structural equations:
πt = φππe
t+1 +( 1− φπ)πt−1 + απ(ut − u∗
t)+eπ,t,e π ∼ iid(0,σ2
eπ), (4)
ut = φuue
t+1 +( 1− φu)ut−1 + αu (re
t − r∗)+eu,t,e u ∼ iid(0,σ2
eu), (5)
where π denotes inﬂation, u denotes the unemployment rate, u∗ denotes the true natural
rate of unemployment, r denotes the ex ante short-term real interest rate and r∗ the natural
real rate of interest.
The “Phillips curve” in this model (equation 4) relates inﬂation (measured as the an-
nualized percent change in the GNP or GDP price index, depending on the period) during
quarter t to lagged inﬂation, expected future inﬂation, and the unemployment gap during
the current quarter. The parameter φπ measures the importance of expected inﬂation on
the determination of inﬂation, while (1−φπ) captures inﬂation inertia. The unemployment
equation (equation 5) relates the unemployment rate during quarter t to the expected future
unemployment rate and one lag of the unemployment rate and the ex ante real interest rate
gap.
We imposed the coeﬃcients φπ = φu =0 .5 on the lead-lag structure of the two equations.
We opted to concentrate attention on this case to ensure that expectations are of comparable
importance for the determination of the rates of inﬂation and unemployment in the model.
These values for φπ and φu are the largest allowable by the micro-founded theory developed
in Woodford (2003) and are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings of Giannoni and Woodford
(2005) and others.10 To estimate the remaining parameters, as in Orphanides and Williams
(2002), we rely on survey forecasts as proxies for the expectations variable which allows
estimation of equations (4) and (5) with ordinary least squares. Speciﬁcally, we use the
mean values of the forecasts provided in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. From this
survey, we use the forecasts of the unemployment rate and three-month treasury bill rate as
10We note that in the speciﬁcation shown in equations (4) and (5), the data do not reject the value 0.5
for either φπ or φu. The unrestricted point estimate of φπ is in fact close to 0.5. However the unrestricted
estimate of φu is noticeably lower.
14
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deﬂator, which we construct from the forecasts of real and nominal GNP or GDP which
are reported in the survey. We posit that the relevant expectations are those formed in
the previous quarter; that is, we assume that the expectations determining πt and ut are
those collected in quarter t−1. This matches the informational structure in the theoretical
models (see Woodford, 2003, and Giannoni and Woodford, 2005). To match the inﬂation
and unemployment data as best as possible with these forecasts, we use ﬁrst announced
estimates of these series. Our primary sources for these data are the Real-Time Dataset for
Macroeconomists and the Survey of Professional Forecasters, both currently maintained by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Zarnowitz and Braun (1993), Croushore (1993)
and Croushore and Stark (2001)). For the estimation of the inﬂation equation, we also use
the most recent estimates of the NAIRU by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (2001, 2002)
as a proxy of the true level of the historical natural rate of unemployment.
We obtain the following OLS estimates for our model between 1981:4 and 2004:2, where
the starting point of this sample reﬂects the availability of the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters data for the short-term interest rate.
πt =0 .5πe




t)+eπ,t, ˆ σeπ =1 .11,D W =2 .00, (6)
ut =0 .5ue
t+1 +0 .5ut−1 +0.036
(0.017)
(˜ re
t − r∗)+eu,t, ˆ σeu =0 .29,D W =0 .84, (7)
The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard errors of the corresponding regres-
sion coeﬃcients. The estimated unemployment equation also includes a constant term that
provides an estimate of the natural real interest rate, which is assumed to constant in es-
timating this equation. The estimated residuals show no signs of serial correlation in the
price equation. Some serial correlation is suggested by the residuals of the unemployment
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variables. We assume these processes are stationary based on the ﬁnding using the standard
ADF test that one can reject the null of nonstationarity of both the unemployment rate and
real federal funds rate over 1950–2003 at the 5 percent level. However to capture the near-
nonstationarity of the series, we set the AR(1) coeﬃcient to 0.99 and and then calibrate the
innovation variances to be consistent with estimates of time variation in the natural rates
in postwar U.S. data. In particular, we set the innovation standard deviation of the natural
rate of unemployment to 0.07 and that of the natural rate of interest to 0.085. These values
imply an unconditional standard deviation of the natural rate of unemployment (interest)
of 0.50 (0.60), in the low end of the range of standard deviations of smoothed estimates of
these natural rates suggested by various estimation methods (see Orphanides and Williams
2002 for details).
4 Monetary Policy
We evaluate the performance of monetary policies rules using a loss equal to the weighted
sum of the unconditional variances of the inﬂation rate, the unemployment gap, and the
change in the nominal federal funds rate:
L = Va r(π − π∗)+λV ar(u − u∗)+νVar(Δ(i)), (8)
where Va r(x) denotes the unconditional variance of variable x.11 We assume an inﬂation
target of zero percent. As a benchmark for our analysis, we assume λ = 4 and ν =0 .25.
Based on an Okun’s gap type relationship, the variance of the unemployment gap is about
1/4 that of the output gap, so this choice of λ corresponds to equal weights on inﬂation and
output gap variability. We consider the sensitivity of our results to alternative speciﬁcations.
We complete the structural model by specifying a monetary policy rule according to
11Taken literally, the structural model implies a second-order approximation to consumer welfare that is
related to the weighted and discounted sum of expected variances of the quasi-diﬀerence of the inﬂation rate
and the level and quasi-diﬀerence of the unemployment gap. For the present purposes, we use a standard
speciﬁcation of the loss used in much of the monetary policy evaluation literature.
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it = θiit−1 +( 1− θi)(ˆ r∗
t + πt−1)+θπ(πt−1 − π∗)+θu(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t)+θΔu(ut−1 − ut−2), (9)
where ˆ r∗
t−1 is the policymaker’s real-time estimate of the natural rate of interest and ˆ u∗
t is
the real-time estimate of the natural rate of unemployment. We describe the policymaker’s
estimation of natural rates in the next section. As mentioned earlier, we used lagged data
in the policy rule reﬂecting the lag in data releases.12 We focus on this class of four-
parameter monetary policy rules because further increases in the number of terms in the
policy the rule yield relatively small reductions in the central bank loss. In particular,
under rational expectations, the optimized four-parameter rule nearly replicates the ﬁrst-
best optimal policy when natural rates are known and constant.
In the following we focus on diﬀerent versions of this policy rule. In one, all four
parameters are freely chosen. We also examine the two alternative simpler, 2-parameter
rules that are nested by the generalized rule: The “level” variant, where we constrain θi
and θΔu to be zero, and which is closer to the original Taylor rule; and the “diﬀerence”
variant, where we impose the constraints θi = 1 and θu =0 .
5 Expectations
We consider two methods by which private agents form expectations: rational expectations
and learning. Under rational expectations, private agents know all features of the model,
including the realized values of the natural rates. Under learning, we assume that private
agents form expectations using an estimated forecasting model, and that the central bank
forms estimates of the natural rates of interest and unemployment using simple time-series
methods. Speciﬁcally, following Orphanides and Williams (2005c), we posit that private
agents and central banks engage in perpetual learning, that is they reestimate their re-
spective models using a constant-gain least squares algorithm that weighs recent data more
12In Orphanides and Williams (2007), we also explore alternative operational variants of the Taylor rule
that are based on forecasts of inﬂation and economic activity and show that the basic thrust of the results
presented here also applies to forecast-based policies.
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time variation in the economy, including in the natural rates of interest and unemployment.
Given the structure of the model, private agents need to forecast inﬂation, the unemploy-
ment rate, and the federal funds rate for up to two quarters into the future.
5.1 Perpetual Learning with Least Squares
Under perfect knowledge with no shocks to the natural rate of unemployment, the pre-
dictable components of inﬂation, the unemployment rate, and the interest rate in the model
each depend on a constant, one lag each of the inﬂation and the ex post real interest rate
(the diﬀerence between the nominal interest rate and the inﬂation rate), and one or two
two lags of the unemployment rate, depending on whether the policy rule responds to just
the lagged unemployment gap or also the change in the unemployment rate. We assume
that agents estimate forecasting equations for the three variables using a restricted VAR of
the form corresponding to the reduced form of the rational expectations (RE) equilibrium
with constant natural rates. They then construct multi-period forecasts from the estimated
VAR.
Consider the case where policy is described by the Taylor rule. To ﬁx notation, let
Yt denote the 1 × 3 vector consisting of the inﬂation rate, the unemployment rate, and
the interest rate, each measured at time t: Yt =( πt,u t,i t); let Xt be the 4 × 1v e c t o ro f
regressors in the forecast model: Xt =( 1 ,π t−1,u t−1,i t−1−πt−1); let ct be the 4×3 vector of
coeﬃcients of the forecasting model. This corresponds to the case of the Taylor rule. In the
case of the generalized policy rule, the second lag of the unemployment rate also appears
in Xt.
Note that we impose that the forecasting model include only the variables that appear
with non-zero coeﬃcients in the reduced form of the rational expectations solution of the
model with constant natural rates. In principle, these zero restrictions may help or hinder
the forecasting performance of agents in the model. In practice, allowing agents to include
13See also Sargent (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2001), Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Gaspar and Smets
(2002), and Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2006) for related treatments of learning.
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Thus, by imposing this structure, we are likely erring on the side of understating the costs
of learning on macroeconomic performance.
Using data through period t, the least squares regression parameters for the forecasting
model can be written in recursive form:
ct = ct−1 + κtR−1
t Xt(Yt − X 
tct−1), (10)
Rt = Rt−1 + κt(XtX 
t − Rt−1), (11)
where κt is the gain.
Under the assumption of least squares learning with inﬁnite memory, κt =1 /t,a s
t increases, κt converges to zero. Assuming constant natural rates, this mechanism will
converge to the correct expectations functions and the economy converges to the perfect
knowledge rational expectations equilibrium. That is, in our model the perceived law of
motion that agents employ for forecasting corresponds to the correct speciﬁcation of the
equilibrium law of motion under rational expectations.
As noted above, to formalize perpetual learning we replace the decreasing gain implied
by the inﬁnite memory recursion with a small constant gain, κ>0.14 With imperfect
knowledge, expectations are based on the perceived law of motion of the inﬂation process,
governed by the perpetual learning algorithm described above.
5.2 Calibrating the Learning Rate
A key parameter for the constant-gain-learning algorithm is the updating rate κ. To cal-
ibrate the relevant range for this parameter we examined how well diﬀerent values of κ
ﬁt either the expectations data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, following Or-
phanides and Williams (2005b). To examine the ﬁt of the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF), we generated a time series of forecasts using a recursively estimated VAR for the
inﬂation rate, the unemployment rate, and the federal funds rate. In each quarter we rees-
14In terms of forecasting performance, the “optimal” choice of κ depends on the relative variances of the
transitory and permanent shocks, as in the relationship between the Kalman gain and the signal-to-noise
ratio in the case of the Kalman ﬁlter.
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1948 through the most recent observation). We allowed for discounting of past observations
by using geometrically declining weights. This procedure resulted in reasonably accurate
forecasts of inﬂation and unemployment, with root mean squared errors (RMSE) compara-
ble to the residual standard errors from the estimated structural equations, (6) and (7). We
found that discounting past data with values corresponding to κ in the range 0.01 to 0.04
yielded forecasts closer on average to the SPF than the forecasts obtained with lower or
higher values of κ. In light of these results, we consider κ =0 .02 as a baseline value for our
simulations, but also examine the robustness of policies to alternative values of this param-
eter. The value κ =0 .02 is also in line with the discounting reported by Sheridan (2003)
as best for explaining the inﬂation expectations data reported in the Livingston Survey.
5.3 Policymaker’s estimation of natural rates
Given the time variation in the natural rates, policymakers need to continuously reestimate
these variables in real time. Based on the results of Williams (2005) who found that such a
procedure performed well and was reasonably robust to model misspeciﬁcation, we assume
that policymakers use a simple constant gain method to update their natural rates based
on the observed rates of unemployment and ex post real interest rates. Thus, policymakers
update their estimates of the natural rates of unemployment and interest as follows:
ˆ r∗
t =ˆ r∗




t−1 + ζu(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t−1), (13)
where ζr and ζu are the updating parameters. We set ζr = ζu = ζ =0 .005; a lower value
would imply far longer history of usable data than we possess while a higher value reduces
natural rate estimate accuracy.
The model under imperfect knowledge consists of the structural equations for inﬂation,
the unemployment gap, the federal funds rate (the monetary policy rule), the forecasting
model, and the updating rule for the natural rates of interest and unemployment.
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As noted above, we measure the performance of alternative policies rules based on the
central bank loss equal to the weighted sum of unconditional variances of inﬂation, the
unemployment gap, and the change in the funds rate. In the case of rational expectations
with constant and known natural rates, we compute the unconditional variances numerically
as described in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999). In all other cases, we compute
approximations of the unconditional moments using stochastic simulations of the model.
6.1 Stochastic Simulations
For stochastic simulations, the initial conditions for each simulation are given by the rational
expectations equilibrium with known and constant natural rates. Speciﬁcally, all model
variables are initialized to their steady-state values, assumed without loss of generality to
be zero. The central bank’s initial perceived levels of the natural rates are set to their
true values, likewise equal to zero. Finally, the initial values of the c and R matrices
describing the private agents’ forecasting model are initialized to their respective values
corresponding to reduced-form of the rational equilibrium solution to he structural model
assuming constant and known natural rates.
Each period, innovations are generated from Gaussian distributions with variances re-
ported above. The innovations are assumed to be serially and contemporaneously uncor-
related. For each period, the structural model is simulated, the private agent’s forecasting
model is updated and a new set of forecasts computed, and the central bank’s natural rate
estimate is updated. We simulate the model for 41,000 periods and discard the ﬁrst 1000
periods to mitigate the eﬀects of initial conditions. We compute the unconditional mo-
ments from sample root mean squares from the remaining 40,000 periods (10,000 years) of
simulation data.
Private agents’ learning process injects a nonlinear structure into the model that may
generate explosive behavior in a stochastic simulation of suﬃcient length for some policy
rules that would do a good job of stabilizing the economy under rational expectations. One
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explosive. We take the view that in practice private forecasters reject explosive models.
We implement this by computing, in each period of the simulation, the maximum root of
the forecasting VAR excluding the constants. If this root falls below the critical value of
0.995, the forecast model is updated as described above; if not, we assume that the forecast
model is not updated and the matrices C and R are held at their respective previous period
values.15
This constraint on the forecasting model is insuﬃcient to assure that the model econ-
omy does not exhibit explosive behavior in all simulations. For this reason, we impose a
second condition that restrains explosive behavior. In particular, if the inﬂation rate, nom-
inal interest rate, or unemployment gap exceed in absolute value six times their respective
unconditional standard deviations (computed under the assumption of rational expecta-
tions and known and constant natural rates), then the variables that exceed these bounds
are constrained to equal their corresponding limit in that period. These constraints on
the model are suﬃcient to avoid explosive behavior for the exercises that we consider in
this paper and are rarely invoked for most of the policy rules we study, particularly for
optimized policy rules. An illustrative example is the benchmark calibration of the model
with monetary policy given by the Taylor Rule with θπ =0 .5a n dθu = −1, for which the
limit on the forecasting model is binding less than 0.1 percent of the time, and that on the
endogenous variables, only about 0.4 percent of the time.
7 Monetary Policy and Learning
We ﬁrst consider the design of optimal monetary policy in the presence of learning by private
agents but assuming that natural rates are constant and known by the policymaker. In this
way we can more easily identify the private sector eﬀects of learning in isolation. In the
next section, we analyze the case of private learning with time varying natural rates that
are unobserved by the policymaker.
15We chose this critical value so that the test would have a small eﬀect on model simulation behavior
while eliminating explosive behavior in the forecasting model.
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To gauge the eﬀects of learning for a given monetary policy rule, we consider macroeconomic
performance under the Taylor Rule under alternative assumptions regarding the public’s
updating rate, κ. For these exercises, we assume that the policymaker knows the true
values of the natural rates of interest and unemployment and, consequently, does not face
the problem of natural rate misperceptions.
Table 1 reports the performance of the Taylor Rule given by θπ =0 .5a n dθu = −1.0.
The coeﬃcient on the unemployment gap has the reverse sign and is twice the size of the
coeﬃcient of 0.5 on the output gap in the standard Taylor rule, the latter modiﬁcation
reﬂecting the smaller variation in the unemployment gap relative to the output gap. The
ﬁrst row shows the outcomes under rational expectations. (This can also be thought of
as corresponding to the limiting case κ = 0.) The second through fourth rows show the
outcomes under learning for values of κ ranging from 0.01 to 0.03 (recall that 0.02 is our
benchmark value).
The time variation in the coeﬃcients of the forecasting model determining expectations
induces greater variability and persistence in inﬂation and the unemployment gap. As
shown in Table 1, the variability in these variables rises with the learning rate, κ,a sd o e s
their ﬁrst-order unconditional autocorrelation.
In this model, the introduction of learning with constant natural rates induces nearly
proportional increases in the variability of inﬂation and the unemployment gap. For ex-
ample, in the case of κ =0 .02, the standard deviation of inﬂation is 32 percent higher
than under rational expectations, and that of the unemployment gap is 33 percent higher.
This holds true for other values of κ and stems from the fact that the model equations for
inﬂation and the unemployment rate have identical lead-lag structures. It is worth noting
that in other models, the two variables may be aﬀected diﬀerently by learning.
The rise in persistence results from the eﬀects of shocks on the estimated parameters
of the forecasting model. Consider, for example, a positive shock to inﬂation. Upon reesti-
mation of the forecasting model, a portion of the shock will pass through to the intercept
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inﬂation, which boosts inﬂation, and so on. If by chance another positive shock arrives, the
estimated coeﬃcient on lagged inﬂation in the forecasting model will be elevated, further
raising the persistence of inﬂation.
A key aspect of learning is that its eﬀects are especially felt in episodes when particularly
large shocks or a series of positively correlated shocks occurs. Indeed, the model impulse
responses to i.i.d. shocks, evaluated at the steady state, are quantitatively little diﬀerent
from those in the model under rational expectations. However, following an unusually large
shock or a sequence of shocks in the same direction, the nonlinear nature of the learning
process can have profound eﬀects. The unconditional moments thus represent an average of
periods in which the behavior of the economy is approximately that described by the rational
expectations equilibrium and episodes in which expectations deviate signiﬁcantly from that
implied by rational expectations. Such “problem” episodes contribute importantly to the
deterioration in macroeconomic performance reported in the table.
7.2 Optimized Taylor-style Rules
We now consider the optimal coeﬃcients of the Taylor-style rule under diﬀerent assumptions
regarding learning. As noted above, for this exercise we assume weights of 4 on unemploy-
ment gap variability and 0.25 on interest rate variability. Table 2 reports summary results.
The ﬁrst two columns in the table report the optimized coeﬃcients of the policy rules,
the third through ﬁfth columns report the standard deviations of the target variables, and
the sixth column reports the associated loss, denoted by L∗. The ﬁnal column reports the
loss under the policy rule optimized under rational expectations (RE), denoted by LRE,
evaluated under the alternative speciﬁcations of learning.
As can be seen, the optimized Taylor-style rule under rational expectations performs
very poorly when the public in fact is learning. If policy is given by the optimal policy
assuming rational expectations, the loss under the benchmark value of κ =0 .02 is nearly 60
percent higher than under the optimized Taylor-style rule policy given in the third row of the
table. The problem with the policy rule coeﬃcients chosen assuming rational expectations
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ﬂuctuations to feed into inﬂation expectations and thereby to inﬂation, driving the standard
deviation of inﬂation to 2.8 percent for κ =0 .02.
A particular problem with the policy optimized assuming rational expectations is that
it allows the autocorrelation of inﬂation to rise considerably if agents engage in learning,
prolonging the response of inﬂation expectations to any shock. For example, under the op-
timal policy assuming rational expectations, the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of inﬂation rises
from 0.71 under rational expectations to 0.90 under learning with κ =0 .02. The eﬃcient
policy response with learning responds more aggressively to inﬂation relative to the optimal
response under rational expectations. The stronger response to inﬂation dampens inﬂation
variability and lowers the autocorrelation of inﬂation. Indeed, focusing on the outcomes
under the optimal policies, the resulting autocorrelation of inﬂation is only modestly higher
under learning than it is under rational expectations. Together, these eﬀects reduce dam-
aging ﬂuctuations in the coeﬃcients of the private agents’ forecasting model and ensure
greater economic stability.
8 Interaction of Learning and Time-varying Natural Rates
Having examined some of the policy implications of perpetual learning under the maintained
assumption that natural rates are known and constant, we now turn our attention to the
more general case that acknowledges the possible presence of time variation in the natural
rates of interest and unemployment. In terms of the model, we add innovations to the
natural rate equations, introduce the central bank’s real-time updating problem and keep
track of the way in which policymaker estimates of the natural rate inﬂuence the setting of
policy. The learning model of the agents remains the same as considered before.
8.1 The Eﬀects of Learning and Natural Rate Variation
Table 3 summarizes the optimal policy responses and associated economic outcomes under
learning and time-varying natural rates when monetary policy follows the classic Taylor
rule. The rows corresponding to “s = 0” report the results where both natural rates are
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reported in Table 1 and provide a point of reference for the results that incorporate time
variation in the natural rates. The rows corresponding to “s = 1” report the results for the
main calibration of the innovation variances. Finally, the rows under the heading “s =2 ”
report the results associated with standard deviation of the natural rate innovations that
are twice as large. The layout of the table is the same as Table 1 except that we have added
columns reporting the standard deviations of natural rate misperceptions.
Under the benchmark calibration of the innovation variances and private sector learning,
the standard deviation of central bank misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment
is 0.6 percentage points, while that of the natural rate of interest is about 1.1 percentage
points. With higher innovation variances given by s = 2, the standard deviation of misper-
ceptions of the natural rate of unemployment increases to about 1.0 percentage points, and
of the natural rate of interest rises to about 1.6 percentage points. In all cases, these mis-
perceptions are highly persistent, with ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of about 0.99 (not shown
in the table).
Time varying natural rates inject serially correlated errors to the processes driving inﬂa-
tion, the unemployment rate, and the interest rate. The coeﬃcients of the private agents’
forecasting model only gradually adjust to changes in the natural rates. Moreover, policy-
makers themselves are unavoidably confused about the true level of natural rates and these
misperceptions feed back into the coeﬃcient estimates of the agents’ forecasting model. As
a result, these shocks and the feedback through policy back into expectations cause a dete-
rioration in macroeconomic performance. For a given rate of learning, the inclusion of time
varying natural rates aﬀects the standard deviations of inﬂation and the unemployment gap
in about the same proportion. The introduction of time-varying natural rates also raises the
autocorrelations of inﬂation and the unemployment rate gap, as seen in the ﬁnal columns
of Table 3.
To assess how policymakers would wish to adjust policy under alternative assumptions
regarding learning and natural rate variation, Table 4 reports the optimized Taylor-style
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and 3. For comparison, the case of constant natural rates reported in Table 2 is provided
in the rows corresponding to s =0 .
As can be seen in the table, for a given rate of learning, time variation in natural rates
raises the optimal policy response to inﬂation and lowers that to the perceived unemploy-
ment gap. For example, for κ =0 .02, the optimal coeﬃcient on inﬂation rises from 0.77
to 1.08 to 1.24 for s =0 ,1, and 2, respectively, and that on the unemployment gap falls
from 1.20 to 0.99 to 0.60 (in absolute value). The performance of the RE-optimal Taylor-
style rule, given in the ﬁnal column, is truly abysmal in the model under learning and
time-varying natural rates.
Interestingly, for a given positive natural rate innovation variance, the optimal coeﬃ-
cients both on inﬂation and the unemployment gap are generally higher the greater is κ.
With time-varying natural rates but a low rate of learning, the optimal policy is to dampen
the response to the mismeasured unemployment gap and to concentrate on inﬂation. In this
case, expectations help stabilize the unemployment gap even with a modest direct policy
response to the gap, as discussed in Orphanides and Williams (2002). But, with a higher
rate of learning, noise in the economy, including that related to time-varying natural rates,
interferes with the public’s understanding of the economy and expectations formation may
no longer act as a stabilizing inﬂuence. In these circumstances, policy needs to respond rela-
tively strongly to the perceived unemployment gap, even recognizing that this may amplify
policy errors owing to natural rate misperceptions. Doing so helps stabilize unemployment
expectations and avoids situations where private expectations of unemployment veer away
from fundamentals.
Figure 1 presents a graphical perspective on the performance of the economy correspond-
ing to alternative rules under the various possibilities regarding the degree of time-variation
in natural rates and rate of learning. In the ﬁgure, each panel shows iso-loss contours drawn
from the loss associated with policies for alternative parameters θπ and θu, as shown in the
two axes. The top left panel shows the loss associated with these policies under rational
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nal expectations or under learning for diﬀerent degrees of variation in the natural rates,
s = {0,1,2}. Each panel corresponds to one of the 12 possible alternative combinations of
these assumptions—comparable to the alternatives in Table 4. The minimum loss achiev-
able with a Taylor rule under the assumptions in each panel is also identiﬁed. Comparing
these points across the diﬀerent panels shows how the optimal response coeﬃcients of the
Taylor rule vary with the alternative assumptions. The ﬁgure also allows examination of
the loss associated with a speciﬁc policy that may be optimal under one set of assump-
tions when implemented in an economy where an alternative set of assumptions hold. This
provides a useful graphical overview of the robustness characteristics of alternative rules.
Of particular interest in this regard is an important asymmetry pertaining to the robust-
ness characteristics of the responsiveness to inﬂation in the Taylor rule. While the loss
across alternative assumptions is extremely sensitive to changes in θπ when that is near
the RE-optimal policy, a similar sensitivity is not evident for the higher values of θπ that
are optimal under learning. This suggests that robust Taylor rule policies may need to be
considerably more aggressive towards inﬂation compared to the RE-optimal policies. We
return to a detailed examination of the design of robust rules later on.
8.2 Optimized Diﬀerence Rule
The Taylor-style rule implicitly places a coeﬃcients of one on the perceived natural rate of
interest and −θu on the perceived unemployment gap. As discussed in Orphanides et al
(2000) and Orphanides and Williams (2002) in forward-looking models with natural rate
misperceptions, an alternative speciﬁcation of a policy rule that does not respond directly
to perceived natural rates may perform better than the Taylor-style rule speciﬁcation. In
light of that, we consider one such speciﬁcation of a two-parameter policy rule in which
θi is constrained to equal one, θu is constrained to equal zero, and θπ and θΔu are freely
chosen to minimize the policymaker loss. We refer to policy rules with this speciﬁcation
as “diﬀerence” rules. Because the policy rule responds to the lagged ﬁrst-diﬀerence of the
unemployment rate, we expand private agents’ forecasting model to include the second lag
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reduced form rational expectations solution of the model with constant natural rates. Table
5 summarizes the results from rules in this class that are optimized to the 12 alternative
sets of assumptions regarding the formation of expectation and variation in natural rates.
The losses resulting under the optimized diﬀerence rules are reported in the sixth column
under the heading L∗
D; for comparison, the loss under the optimized Taylor-style rule is
given in the ﬁnal column of the table. Figure 2 presents contour plots of these rules under
the alternative assumptions, in a format directly comparable to that of Figure 1, except
that θΔu rather than θu is plotted on the vertical axis.
As can be seen in the table, with time-varying natural rates, the optimized ﬁrst-diﬀerence
rules outperform the optimized Taylor-style rules. The more volatile the natural rates are,
the greater the performance advantage of the diﬀerence rules over the Taylor-style rules.
With constant natural rates, the Taylor-style rules perform better than the diﬀerence rules,
reﬂecting the fact that when policymakers have perfect knowledge of the natural rates of
interest and unemployment, it pays to use this information in the setting of policy. We
conclude that in an environment of imperfect knowledge, diﬀerence rules may provide a
better simple benchmark for policy than level Taylor-style rules.
As in the case of the Taylor-style rule, both the existence of private sector learning
and time variation in natural rates imply stronger optimal responses to inﬂation relative
to rational expectations. The optimal coeﬃcient on the change in the unemployment rate,
however, is relatively insensitive to the learning rate and the degree of natural rate variation.
In addition, as can be seen from the ﬁgure, in all panels the loss function appears to be
relatively ﬂat in the region around the optimal diﬀerence rule for our benchmark case with
learning (s = 1 and κ =0 .02), suggesting that a benchmark diﬀerence rule can be selected
that would be robust to uncertainty regarding the precise degree of time-variation in natural
rates and expectations formation mechanism.
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Next, we consider the performance of the generalized form of the policy rule that combines
elements of both the Taylor rule and the diﬀerence rule studied above. The speciﬁcation,
shown in equation (9), is the same as in Orphanides and Williams (2002). Here, the interest
rate depends on the lagged interest rate, the lagged inﬂation rate and perceived unemploy-
ment gap, and the lagged change in the unemployment rate. Optimal rules for each of the
twelve combinations of alternative assumptions regarding learning and natural rates are
shown in Table 6. In the table, which follows the same general structure as Tables 4 and 5,
the loss from the optimal generalized policy rule is denoted by L∗
4; for comparison, the loss
resulting from the optimized diﬀerence rule, denoted by L∗
D, and the optimized Taylor-style
rule, denoted by L∗
2, are reported in the ﬁnal two columns of the table.
The optimized four-parameter rules perform signiﬁcantly better than the optimized
Taylor-style rules, especially in the presence of time varying natural rates, and outperforms
the simple diﬀerence rule, particularly when natural rates are constant. This superior per-
formance is related to three factors. First, rules in this class respond to more variables
(in particular, the lagged funds rate), and thus have an advantage over the simple Taylor
rule. Second, by incorporating a near-unity response to the lagged funds rate, the optimal
generalized rules nearly completely remove the perceived natural rate of interest from inﬂu-
encing policy. Movements in the true natural rate of interest aﬀect the economy, but there
is no direct feedback of central bank misperceptions of the natural rate of interest to the
economy. Third, by responding to the change in the unemployment rate as a proxy for the
unemployment gap, this speciﬁcation allows for a strong response to utilization variables
without relying exclusively on imperfect measures of the gap.
9 Robust Policy
A striking feature of the results from the generalized policy rule is that the optimal coeﬃ-
cients of the rule do not appear to be very sensitive to the rates of learning that we consider
or the magnitude of variation in natural rates, as long as both elements are present. In
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inﬂation and the unemployment gap vary, but are generally of approximately the same size.
And the coeﬃcient on the change in the unemployment rate is relatively similar across
the diﬀerent cases. These ﬁndings suggest that precise knowledge regarding the extent of
imperfections in the formation of expectations or extent of natural-rate variation may not
be crucial for designing a good policy rule. What is more critical is to acknowledge these
imperfections in the design of the rule.
To highlight the concern for robustness, Figures 3 and 4 present a graphical summary
of alternative simulations that quantify the costs of pursuing policy optimized under poten-
tially incorrect assumptions. In Figure 3 we examine the problem arising from potentially
incorrect assumptions regarding the extent of variation in natural rates. To isolate this com-
plication, we maintain that expectations are rational and plot the outcomes corresponding
to the generalized policy rules optimized for s = {0,1,2}.16 (The parameters of these rules
are shown in the ﬁrst three rows of Table 6). As can be seen, the performance of the rule
optimized under perfect knowledge is truly abysmal for even small degrees of time-variation,
whereas, the performance of the rules optimized for s = 1 and s = 2 is relatively insensitive
to the true degree of variation in natural rates.
Similarly, in Figure 4 we examine the problem arising from potentially incorrect assump-
tions regarding the formation of expectations. To illustrate this complication in isolation,
we maintain s = 0 and plot the outcomes corresponding to the generalized policy rules
optimized for κ = {0,0.01,0.02}. (The parameters of these rules are shown in rows 1, 4
and 7 in Table 6). Here as well, we see that the performance of the rule optimized on the
assumption that expectations are rational (denoted with κ = 0 here) deteriorates rapidly
as the true value of κ increases, and is quite poor even when κ is much smaller than our
benchmark value of 0.02. By contrast, the performance of the rules optimized for either
κ =0 .01 or κ =0 .02 is much less sensitive to the true value and the loss is smaller than
16With the maintained assumption of rational expectations, this experiment follows that reported in
Orphanides and Williams (2002) concerning unknown natural rates and provides conﬁrmation of the results
reported there.
that of the RE-optimal rule for any values of κ larger than 0.005.
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edge can be costly in both of the dimensions of uncertainty we consider. The challenge is
to design a policy rule that would be robust to all recognized sources of uncertainty. To
that end, we turn to an examination of robustness of a benchmark policy following the
methodology in Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003). An informative benchmark rule may
be identiﬁed with the optimal policy rule corresponding to an agnostic Bayesian prior when
the policymaker does not know which among a range of models is a better representation
of the economy. For our benchmark, we assume that the policymaker is unsure about both
the degree of structural change in the economy, as reﬂected in variation in natural rates,
as well as about how expectations are formed, that is whether they are rational or based
on adaptive learning. Thus, we assume the policymaker has a ﬂat prior on three possible
values of s = {0,1,2}), and on four possible models for expectations, rational and learning
with values κ = {0.01,0.02,0.03}. The policymaker’s objective, then, is to identify the
policy rule (8) that minimizes the expected loss (9) accounting for his agnostic prior over
the correct model. Note that since he is uncertain about the presence of structural change,
the policymaker updates his estimates of natural rates using his updating rules (12) and
(13) to set policy.
The optimal Bayesian policy for our baseline loss (λ = 4 and ν =0 .25) is:
it =0 .96it−1 +(1−0.96)(ˆ r∗
t +πt−1)+0.69(πt−1 −π∗)−0.75(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t)−2.57(ut−1 −ut−2).
Note that this is rather similar to the optimal policy corresponding to the optimized rule for
κ =0 .02 and s = 1 reported in Table 6. Table 7 reports the performance of the economy
when this benchmark policy rule is followed for the various alternative speciﬁcations of
expectations formation and natural rate variation. The last two columns present a summary
comparison. The ﬁfth column LB
4 , reports the loss associated with the speciﬁcation listed in
he ﬁrst column when the optimal Bayesian rule is followed. The last column, L∗
4 reports the
best-obtainable loss from a four-parameter rule optimized to that particular speciﬁcation
of the model, as given in Table 6.
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parameterizations of learning and natural rate ﬂuctuations. In the parlance of Levin and
Williams (2003), the model is reasonably fault tolerant once policy has accounted for some
degree of learning and natural rate variation. The relative performance of this rule is
actually poorest in the cases of little or no learning and constant natural rates. But,
these are states of the world that are associated with the lowest loss so from a robustness
perspective, the loss in eﬃciency in such situations is less worrisome than the outcomes
corresponding to the larger losses that might occur under substantial variation in natural
rates and learning. Remarkably, the relative performance of the benchmark rule is excellent
for all values of κ for both s = 1 and s =2 .
Three of the parameters of the benchmark Bayesian rule diﬀer noticeably from the RE-
optimal policy. First, the response of policy to inﬂation is considerably more aggressive.
Second, the rule is almost completely inertial, that is, θi is close to unity. Third the policy
responsiveness to changes in unemployment is larger, while that to the level of the estimated
unemployment gap is muted. To check the sensitivity of these ﬁndings to the assumption of
a ﬂat prior over the twelve model speciﬁcations, we also repeated the Bayesian optimization
with alternative priors. The results suggested that the optimal Bayesian policy exhibited
these three diﬀerences relative to the RE-optimal policy for a wide range of alternatives
in our model. In particular these results held as long as the policymaker assigned some
non-trivial probability to the possibility that knowledge is imperfect.
An alternative way to design a robust policy is by identifying the optimal rule under a
Min-Max criterion. The Min-Max policy minimizes the maximum loss for the model under
the alternative assumptions under consideration which here occurs when κ and s take their
largest values, 0.03 and 2, respectively. The loss corresponding to this rule for the 12
alternative sets of assumptions is reported in the column labeled LM
4 in Table 8. As can
be seen in the table, this rule does very well when κ and s are in the upper halves of their
respective allowable ranges, but not as well when these parameters are both in the lower
halves of the ranges. Indeed, in only two of the twelve cases of parameter combinations that
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those cases the loss is only very modestly lower.
The analysis above was based on a baseline speciﬁcation of the loss function, but we
are also interested in the sensitivity of robust-rule design to alternative weights. This is
of particular interest because, as with other aspects of the monetary policy problem, it
is not entirely clear what the appropriate relative weights on the stabilization of inﬂation
and employment should be. Recall that our baseline loss function has a unit weight on
inﬂation and a weight λ = 4 on unemployment variability (which corresponds to a unit
weight on output gap variability). In Table 9 we show the parameters of optimal rules
for alternative values of λ ranging from 0 to 16. For each speciﬁcation, we compare the
parameters of the RE-optimal rule with the parameters of the optimal Bayesian and Min-
Max rules corresponding to the same preferences. Some key results are evident for all of the
relative stabilization weights. The robust rules exhibit a high degree of inertia and are much
more responsive to inﬂation than the corresponding RE-optimal policies. Indeed, with the
Min-Max criterion, the optimal rule is essentially a diﬀerence rule (θi = 1) and the robust
response to inﬂation is about 1 regardless of the weight in the loss functions. Relative to
the RE-optimal policies, the robust rules are much less responsive to the unemployment
gap and more responsive to changes in unemployment, but these parameters vary with the
relative weight in the loss function.
Finally, we wish to examine the robustness of simpler policies than the generalized rule
which has four parameters, as simpler rules, for example rules that only have one or two
argument, may be more useful than their more complicated counterparts in policy discus-
sions. To that end, we compute the optimal Bayesian and Min-Max level and diﬀerence
rules each of which has only two parameters. We report results for the baseline preferences
we consider, λ = 4 and ν =0 .25. For the Bayesian rules, we employ the same ﬂat prior
over the alternative models of learning and natural rates as before. The resulting optimal
Bayesian rules are:
it =ˆ r∗
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The corresponding Min-Max rules are:
it =ˆ r∗
t + πt−1 +1 .43(πt−1 − π∗) − 0.87(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t)
it = it−1 +0 .95(πt−1 − π∗) − 4.60(ut−1 − ut−2).
Table 10 presents a summary comparison of the optimal two-parameter rules. The optimal
level rule performs uniformly worse than the optimal diﬀerence rule in this comparison.
Given a choice among these simple alternatives, the diﬀerence rule proves clearly more
robust in protecting against the uncertainties regarding expectations formation and natural
rates. But, as can be seen by comparing the loss to those in Table 8, the generalized rule
with its added ﬂexibility delivers better performance, especially when s is small.
10 Conclusion
In an environment of imperfect knowledge regarding the potential for structural change in
the economy and the formation of expectations, the scope for stabilization of the real side
of our economy may be signiﬁcantly reduced relative to an economy under rational expec-
tations with perfect knowledge. Policies that appear to be optimal under perfect knowledge
can perform very poorly if they are implemented in such an environment. In our model econ-
omy, the presence of imperfect knowledge tends to raise the persistence of inﬂation, partly
as a result of the persistent policy errors due to misperceptions of the natural rates and
partly as a result of the learning process agents may rely upon to form expectations. This
leads to a deterioration in economic performance, especially with regard to a policymaker’s
price stability objective. Policymakers who recognize the presence of these imperfections
in the economy can adjust their policies and protect against this deterioration in economic
outcomes.
Eﬃcient policies that take account of private learning and misperceptions of natural rates
appear to have two important characteristics. First, and arguably most important, these
policies call for more aggressive responses to inﬂation that would be optimal under perfect
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central bank policy practice with policies that may appear to stress the role of maintaining
price stability more than might appear warranted in simple models of the economy under
perfect knowledge. Second, eﬃcient policies exhibit a high degree of inertia in the setting
of the interest rate. Indeed, simple diﬀerence rules which circumvent the need to rely on
uncertain estimates of natural rates in setting policy, appear to be robust to potential
misspeciﬁcation of private sector learning and the magnitude of variation in natural rates.
Importantly, it seems possible to design a simple policy rule that can deliver reasonably good
macroeconomic performance even in an environment of considerable uncertainty regarding
expectations formation and natural rate uncertainty.
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κπ u − u∗ Δiπ u − u∗ i
RE 1.48 0.54 1.96 0.64 0.77 0.60
0.01 1.68 0.63 1.97 0.72 0.83 0.67
0.02 1.95 0.72 1.99 0.79 0.86 0.75
0.03 2.13 0.79 2.03 0.81 0.88 0.78
Notes: it =ˆ r∗
t + πt−1 +0 .5 × (πt−1 − π∗) − 1 × (ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t)
Table 2
Optimized Taylor-style Rule with Learning
(constant natural rates)
Policy Rule Standard First-order
Coeﬃcient Deviation Autocorrelation Loss
κπ u − u∗ πu − u∗ Δiπ u − u∗ L∗ LRE
RE 0.16 −1.38 1.60 0.47 1.53 0.71 0.75 4.0 4.0
0.01 0.53 −1.21 1.69 0.61 2.02 0.73 0.82 5.4 7.0
0.02 0.77 −1.20 1.73 0.72 2.34 0.74 0.85 6.4 10.3
0.03 0.89 −1.37 1.81 0.77 2.53 0.75 0.86 7.3 12.4
Notes: it =ˆ r∗
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sπ u − u∗ Δiu ∗ − ˆ u∗ r∗ − ˆ r∗ πu − u∗ i
RE
0 1.48 0.54 1.96 — — 0.64 0.77 0.60
1 1.91 0.56 1.96 0.42 0.50 0.78 0.78 0.74
2 2.82 0.60 1.99 0.83 1.00 0.89 0.78 0.87
κ =0 .01
0 1.68 0.63 1.97 — — 0.72 0.83 0.67
1 2.13 0.84 1.99 0.60 1.18 0.82 0.90 0.82
2 2.87 1.16 2.02 1.06 1.73 0.90 0.94 0.89
κ =0 .02
0 1.95 0.72 1.99 — — 0.79 0.86 0.75
1 2.53 0.92 2.03 0.60 0.96 0.87 0.91 0.85
2 3.46 1.22 2.10 1.09 1.56 0.92 0.94 0.92
κ =0 .03
0 2.13 0.79 2.03 — — 0.81 0.88 0.78
1 2.78 0.98 2.05 0.61 0.95 0.89 0.92 0.87
2 3.82 1.27 2.17 1.09 1.46 0.93 0.94 0.92
Notes: it =ˆ r∗
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0 0.16 -1.38 1.60 0.47 1.53 4.0 4.0
1 0.72 -0.65 1.62 0.60 2.24 5.3 19.9
2 1.02 -0.39 1.72 0.68 2.64 6.5 67.6
κ =0 .01
0 0.53 -1.21 1.69 0.61 2.02 5.4 7.0
1 0.74 -0.57 1.80 0.90 2.29 7.8 24.7
2 1.05 -0.31 1.88 1.23 2.72 11.4 199.8
κ =0 .02
0 0.77 -1.20 1.73 0.72 2.34 6.4 10.3
1 1.08 -0.99 1.81 0.94 2.76 8.7 44.8
2 1.24 -0.60 1.96 1.24 2.98 12.2 195.3
κ =0 .03
0 0.89 -1.37 1.81 0.77 2.53 7.3 12.4
1 1.20 -1.03 1.86 0.98 2.96 9.5 57.2
2 1.43 -0.87 2.02 1.23 3.28 12.9 260.6
Notes: it =ˆ r∗
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0 0.31 -3.76 1.75 0.58 1.34 4.9 4.0
1 0.39 -3.72 1.74 0.63 1.37 5.1 5.3
2 0.52 -3.63 1.74 0.72 1.43 5.6 6.5
κ =0 .01
0 0.49 -4.04 1.79 0.72 1.54 5.9 5.4
1 0.54 -3.94 1.78 0.87 1.54 6.8 7.8
2 0.68 -3.82 1.78 1.15 1.60 9.1 11.4
κ =0 .02
0 0.57 -4.08 1.84 0.82 1.61 6.7 6.4
1 0.65 -4.20 1.83 0.94 1.70 7.6 8.7
2 0.82 -4.15 1.82 1.19 1.80 9.7 12.2
κ =0 .03
0 0.76 -4.51 1.85 0.92 1.87 7.7 7.3
1 0.85 -4.55 1.83 1.02 1.95 8.5 9.5
2 0.95 -4.60 1.85 1.23 2.04 10.5 12.9
Notes: it = it−1 + θπ(πt−1 − π∗)+θΔu(ut−1 − ut−2)
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0 0.76 0.18 -0.97 -0.43 1.51 0.47 0.77 3.3 4.9 4.0
1 0.92 0.45 -0.66 -1.72 1.58 0.61 1.08 4.2 5.1 5.3
2 0.92 0.56 -0.41 -2.28 1.64 0.71 1.27 5.1 5.6 6.5
κ =0 .01
0 0.85 0.42 -1.01 -1.23 1.60 0.61 1.12 4.4 5.9 5.4
1 0.95 0.52 -0.74 -1.89 1.60 0.83 1.21 5.7 6.8 7.8
2 1.00 0.68 -0.60 -2.50 1.66 1.13 1.41 8.3 9.1 11.4
κ =0 .02
0 0.87 0.61 -1.09 -1.78 1.64 0.71 1.43 5.2 6.7 6.4
1 0.95 0.66 -0.80 -2.43 1.66 0.89 1.48 6.5 7.6 8.7
2 1.00 0.83 -0.62 -2.93 1.70 1.16 1.66 9.0 9.7 12.2
κ =0 .03
0 0.93 0.63 -1.13 -2.17 1.78 0.76 1.53 6.1 7.7 7.3
1 0.99 0.84 -0.94 -3.01 1.71 0.95 1.80 7.3 8.5 9.5
2 1.00 1.00 -0.69 -3.34 1.73 1.20 1.95 9.7 10.5 12.9
Notes: it = θiit−1 +( 1− θi)(ˆ r∗
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0 1.43 0.62 1.48 4.1 3.3
1 1.51 0.64 1.48 4.4 4.2
2 1.71 0.67 1.49 5.3 5.1
κ =0 .01
0 1.51 0.70 1.50 4.8 4.4
1 1.55 0.85 1.50 5.8 5.7
2 1.70 1.12 1.50 8.4 8.3
κ =0 .02
0 1.59 0.77 1.51 5.4 5.2
1 1.64 0.90 1.51 6.5 6.5
2 1.84 1.14 1.53 9.2 9.0
κ =0 .03
0 1.71 0.84 1.55 6.3 6.1
1 1.77 0.96 1.55 7.4 7.3
2 1.98 1.18 1.57 10.1 9.7
Notes: Each row shows the performance of the economy under alternative assumptions
regarding the true mechanism for the formation of expectations (RE and learning with
κ = {0.01,0.02,0.03}) and variation in natural rates (s = {0,1,2}) when the policymaker
follows the optimal Bayesian policy:
it =0 .96it−1 +(1−0.96)(ˆ r∗
t +πt−1)+0.69(πt−1 −π∗)−0.75(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t)−2.57(ut−1 −ut−2).
The parameters in this rule minimize the expected loss associated with the alternative
assumptions shown under a uniform prior.
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0 1.43 0.70 1.91 4.9 4.1 3.3
1 1.46 0.71 1.91 5.0 4.4 4.2
2 1.55 0.74 1.91 5.5 5.3 5.1
κ =0 .01
0 1.48 0.77 1.93 5.5 4.8 4.4
1 1.49 0.90 1.92 6.4 5.8 5.7
2 1.56 1.14 1.92 8.6 8.4 8.3
κ =0 .02
0 1.54 0.84 1.93 6.1 5.4 5.2
1 1.55 0.95 1.93 6.9 6.5 6.5
2 1.64 1.16 1.93 9.0 9.2 9.0
κ =0 .03
0 1.60 0.91 1.95 6.8 6.3 6.1
1 1.64 1.01 1.95 7.7 7.4 7.3
2 1.73 1.20 1.95 9.7 10.1 9.7
Notes: Each row shows the performance of the economy under alternative assumptions
regarding the true mechanism for the formation of expectations (RE and learning with
κ = {0.01,0.02,0.03}) and variation in natural rates (s = {0,1,2}) when the policymaker
follows the Min-Max generalized policy:
it = it−1 +1 .00(πt−1 − π∗) − 0.69(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t) − 3.34(ut−1 − ut−2).
The parameters in this rule minimize the maximum loss expected under any of the alter-
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Robust Generalized Rules with Alternative Preferences
Policy Rule Coeﬃcient
iπ u − u∗ Δu
λ =0
RE-optimal 0.81 0.32 −0.60 −0.31
Bayesian 0.95 0.79 −0.55 −1.06
Min-Max 0.99 1.03 −0.46 −1.59
λ =0 .25
RE-optimal 0.80 0.30 −0.63 −0.23
Bayesian 0.94 0.77 −0.56 −1.16
Min-Max 1.00 1.05 −0.55 −1.76
λ =1 .00
RE-optimal 0.79 0.26 −0.72 −0.03
Bayesian 0.92 0.75 −0.60 −1.58
Min-Max 1.00 1.04 −0.57 −2.34
λ =4 .00
RE-optimal 0.76 0.18 −0.97 −0.43
Bayesian 0.96 0.69 −0.75 −2.57
Min-Max 1.00 1.00 −0.69 −3.34
λ =1 6 .00
RE-optimal 0.73 0.11 −1.46 −1.16
Bayesian 1.00 0.60 −0.84 −4.02
Min-Max 1.00 0.99 −0.97 −5.02
Notes: it = θiit−1 +( 1− θi)(ˆ r∗
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0 6.1 5.7 5.3 5.2
1 6.3 5.8 5.6 5.3
2 7.0 6.0 6.6 5.7
κ =0 .01
0 6.8 6.4 6.1 6.0
1 8.5 7.2 8.0 6.8
2 11.8 9.3 11.6 9.1
κ =0 .02
0 7.5 7.1 6.9 6.8
1 9.1 7.8 8.7 7.6
2 12.3 9.8 12.4 9.9
κ =0 .03
0 8.2 7.9 7.6 7.8
1 9.8 8.6 9.5 8.5
2 12.9 10.5 13.3 10.7
Notes: Each row compares the loss incurred under alternative assumptions regarding the
true mechanism for the formation of expectations and variation in natural rates for two-
parameter optimal Bayesian and Min-Max policy rules. The corresponding Min-Max rules
for the level, LM
T , and diﬀerence speciﬁcations, LM
D , are:
it =ˆ r∗
t + πt−1 +1 .43(πt−1 − π∗) − 0.87(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t)
it = it−1 +0 .95(πt−1 − π∗) − 4.60(ut−1 − ut−2)
The corresponding Bayesian rules for the level, LB
T , and diﬀerence speciﬁcations, LB
D, are:
it =ˆ r∗
t + πt−1 +1 .07(πt−1 − π∗) − 0.77(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t)
it = it−1 +0 .65(πt−1 − π∗) − 4.12(ut−1 − ut−2).
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Notes: Each panel shows contours of the loss associated with the Taylor-style policy rule
it =ˆ r∗
t + πt−1 + θπ(πt−1 − π∗)+θu(ut−1 − ˆ u∗
t) for the assumptions regarding expectations
formation and time-variation of the natural rates shown.
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Notes: Each panel shows contours of the loss associated with the diﬀerence rule it =
it−1+θπ(πt−1−π∗)+θΔu(ut−1−ut−2) for the assumptions regarding expectations formation
and time-variation of the natural rates shown.
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The Concern for Robustness: Natural Rate Misperceptions
s
Standard deviation in inflation







Standard deviation in unemployment gap







Standard deviation in funds rate













Optimized for s = 0
Optimized for s = 1
Optimized for s = 2
Notes: In each panel, each line plots the asymptotic standard deviation/expected loss that
obtain with a ﬁxed policy rule for a range of natural-rate variation, s, shown in the horizontal
axis. In all simulations expectations are assumed to be rational. The three ﬁxed policies
represent the generalized rule optimized for s = {0,1,2} under rational expectations.
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The Concern for Robustness: Learning
κ
Standard deviation in inflation
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Optimized for κ = 0.00
Optimized for κ = 0.01
Optimized for κ = 0.02
Notes: In each panel, each line plots the asymptotic standard deviation/expected loss that
obtain with a ﬁxed policy rule under alternative learning rates, κ, shown in the horizontal
axis. In all simulations s = 0. The three ﬁxed policies represent the generalized rule
optimized for κ = {0,0.01,0,02} when s =0 .
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